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Abstract
Financial disasters to hedge funds, bank trading departments and individual spec-
ulative traders and investors seem to always occur because of non-diversification in all
possible scenarios, being overbet and being hit by a bad scenario. Black swans are the
worst type of bad scenario: unexpected and extreme. The Swiss National Bank deci-
sion on January 15, 2015 to abandon the 1.20 peg against the euro was a tremendous
blow for many Swiss exporters, but also Swiss and international investors, hedge funds,
global macro funds, banks as well as the Swiss central bank. In this paper we discuss
the causes for this action, the money losers and the few winners, what it means for
Switzerland, Europe and the rest of the world, what kinds of trades lost and how they
have been prevented.
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1 Not Clockwork: A Short History of the Short-Lived Swiss
Franc Peg
The objective of this paper is threefold. We describe the events surrounding the decision
by the Swiss National Bank to remove the peg between the Swiss Franc and the Euro.
Next, we analyse the reasons behind the creation of the peg. Then, we discuss the short
and long term consequences of the peg’s elimination.
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) pegged the Swiss franc (CHF) to the euro at 1.20 in 2011,
thereby tracking the euro in its moves against all other currencies. The peg was adopted
in the midst of the European debt crisis as the Swiss currency experienced massive safe
haven inflows. These flows of funds were both threatening the competitiveness of the Swiss
economy and creating significant asset bubbles within Switzerland, notably property. In
pegging the Swiss moved away from merely intervening in the exchange the rate to a formal
target. However in either case it significantly expanded their balance sheet.
This was a pledge to buy Swiss francs at that rate even in the face of a growing desire to sell
euros which, unpegged, would have driven the Euro rate down. In essence this meant that
the SNB was pledging to printing Swiss francs on demand. This policy led to the SNB
holding large balances of other currencies. According to Table 1 the SNB “lost” about
CHF78 billion, which is about 12% of the Swiss GDP. They made some CHF38 billion
during 2014.
Table 1: Approximate loss of the SNB in two days following the lifting of the peg
Currency US$ EUR JPY GBP CAD Other Total
Amount Sept 30 (in mln) 142,366 174,335 4,490,747 21,500 24,492 31,578
CHF Equivalent Sept 30 (in mln) 136,102 210,335 39,164 33,336 20,938 31,578 471,453
% of Currency Reserves 28.87% 44.61% 8.31% 7.07% 4.44% 6.70% 100.00%
FX Rate Jan 14 1.0187 1.20095 0.008682 1.5519 0.8524 1
FX Rate Jan 16 0.8587 0.9941 0.0073 1.3016 0.7168 0.85
FX Return -15.71% -17.22% -15.92% -16.13% -15.91% -15.00%
MTM Gain/Loss (in CHF mln) -22,779 -36,061 -6,206 -5,381 -3,321 -4,737 -78,485
Source: Private correspondence with Alex Ziegler, Jan 17, 2015, calculations based on late
September published holdings.
But the dual purposes of the SNB are to make money for its investors (about 55% of the
SNB’s shares are held by public institutions such as cantons, while the remaining 45% are
openly traded on the stock market) and to use its balance sheet as a means of meeting
its monetary policy goals including fighting deflation. The unique structure of the SNB,
compared to most other Central Banks, meant that the two mandates conflicted in a way
2
Currencies Lleo and Ziemba
that impaired the SNB from making its monetary policy goals
Central bank reserve accumulation tends to be negative for its returns, since they have to
effectively take on a negative carry, or accept the risk of future losses. If their accumulation
was the main reason why CHF was staying weak at some point they would have to take
losses.
Moreover, the recent gold referendum (even though it failed) was a sign that the political
costs of expanding the balance sheet had increased and that the Swiss public might not
have been happy about an increase in the fiscal cost of keeping the floor. A sharper move
of the European Central bank (ECB) toward Quantitative Easing (QE), a return of the
Eurozone (EZ) crisis in the name of Greece or Russia related uncertainties, effectively could
put pressure on the exchange rate and thus require it to expand its balance sheet even more
by buying a lot of euros.
The initial aim of the EUR/CHF floor/peg was to stem a further appreciation of the
CHF which was being buffeted by capital inflows during the euro crisis and more recently.
However, the conflict between the SNB’s mandates and the fact that the Swiss were ques-
tioning the effectiveness of the peg made the political costs of maintaining the peg too high
to bear.
Arguably, Switzerland is not the only country directly exposed to the variation of the Euro
and to fundamental changes in the ECB’s policies. Denmark, whose Krone is pegged to the
Euro1, was forced to cut interest four times in just 18 days to defend the fixed exchange
rate. The last move, on February 5th, 2015, made the headline by slashing the Danmarks
Nationalbank’s interest rate on certificates of deposit by 0.25% points to a negative interest
rate of -0.75%. In an effort to defend the peg, the central bank’s currency reserves have
soared between two-thirds and and more than 100% in recent months. They now amount
to more than USD 110 billions, which is about one third of Denmark’s 2014 GDP2.
The Swiss policy is a form of QE. Instead of printing money directly, the central bank
committed to buying Euros in order to weaken the CHF. This type of policy may be
tempting for small countries with an open economy, such as Switzerland. Ultimately, the
costs of such strategy were deemed too great. Now the SNB is relying on negative interest
rates (-0.75%) to try to weaken CHF vs EUR. It is not clear if this will be effective.
Moreover, there could be a lot of collateral damage if investors avoid putting on any hedges
since they trusted the floor and policy.
1The Danish Krone was part of the original European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in force before
the creation of the Euro. Following a referendum in 2000, which saw a rejection of the Euro, Denmark
kept its Krone but pegged it closely to the Euro within an updated version of the ERM, called ERM II.
Denmark is currently the only country left in ERM II after Greece officially adopted the Euro in 2001.
While the ERM II officially allows currencies to float within a range of +/-15% with respect to the euro,
Denmark has opted for a narrow +/- 2.25% band.
2We thank Rachel Ziemba for providing us with this data.
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To be fair, the SNB did a poor job of managing expectations and the risk is that they will
end up having made a policy mistake since they are even more mired in deflation. but we
shouldn’t undercount the political pressures.
If the SNB was just focused on reflationary policies they would have implemented poli-
cies that yield a weaker exchange rate. What surprised market actors was the fact that
if anything with US$/EUR moving so much in anticipation of ECB QE, and the weaker
oil price adding to global/european deflationary trends, the EUR/CHF should have weak-
ened.
In early February the SNB unofficially began targeting an exchange rate corridor of 1.05-
1.10 CHF/euro. The bank was willing to incur losses of a further CHF10 billion over a
period of time that they did not specify. This was another non-transparent action by the
SNB. But it amounts to a revaluation of the Swiss franc by 10-15%.
2 Why did the SNB start the peg and why did they elimi-
nate it?
Why they did it: The peg was installed on September 6, 2011 (Swiss National Bank,
2011). The trigger for the SNB’s decision to end the peg so precipitously, following an
earlier announcement in the same week that they were maintaining it, was probably the
ECB’s hints that it was ready to announce a large scale program of quantitative easing
to attempt to move the EuroZone out of deflation. Indeed, the ECB officially announced
the details of its QE programme on January 22, 2015, one week exactly after Switzerland
removed its peg. The programme calls for a C 60 billion monthly bond purchase, totalling
about C 1 trillion to start in March 2015 until September 2016.
Could the SNB have eliminated the peg gradually? We don’t think so. They could have
announced it over a weekend to soften the blow but the final effect would have been
similar.
The peg was effectively fixed at 1.20. Hong Kong is in a similar situation as its currency
is pegged to the US$.
During the Asian financial crisis, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) was among
the first central banks to engage in quantitative easing. The HKMA was willing to expand
its balance sheet massively, including by purchasing local equity.
Both Hong Kong and Switzerland have small economies with the peg against a much
larger economy. Both have been affected by the larger economy’s monetary policy. Both
are financial centres. This situation can result in shocks. In the case of Hong Kong, the
attempt to balance between the US and China will complicate the maintenance of the
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peg over the longer term. For Switzerland, the shock was the prospect of the ECB’s QE.
Krugman (2015) argues that the situations of Switzerland and Hong Kong are different:
“the institutional setup and history of Hong Kong plays every differently with the hard-
money ideology than the Swiss peg did . . . .” Hong Kong has a currency board to maintain
the peg, and the HKMA does not have the mixed ownership structure of the SNB. The
Swiss could have maintained the peg forever but it was nagging from hard money types
that led to the change in priority. The Swiss currency intervention was the result of a huge
expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet and printing money even if the goal was to
keep it from getting stronger.
3 How does quantitative easing work and what are its costs
and benefits?
To see why talks about an ECB-led Quantitative Easing programme most probably deliv-
ered the final blow to the Swiss peg, we need to understand how quantitative easing work
and what its effects have been so far.
Although Quantitative Easing is new in the Eurozone, it has been used for more than
6 years in the US has early. The track record of QE in the US is checkered at best.
QE managed to reflate asset markets while failing to support final demand and pushing
investors into higher yielding assets. According to Sandra Schwartz:
We have been sold a bill of goods on quantitative easing. It is not a new
monetary policy, but a variant, only the Instruments are different - buying up
the debt of banks and others rather than buying up government debt.
With quantitative easing all economic policy has been placed on the shoulders
of monetary policy and this has been very indirect and has led primarily to an
asset bubble.
With fiscal policy, that is running a government deficit, good and services are
are bought directly and the quantitative easing happens when the bank buys
the debt that the government has created to facilitate it. When there is un-
employment this does not crowd out private investment but gets the economy
moving. It could build infrastructure that directly will later help private in-
vestment. As it is directly spent on goods and services, it does not create an
asset bubble but it creates jobs, employment and income.
The U.S. took an approach to stimulate the economy and not have austerity measures
imposed on the companies and people. This has led to a robust economy and a stock mar-
ket up three times since the March 6 low. Figure 1 displays the evolution of the S&P500
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since the start of QE 1 in late November 2008. The level of the S&P500 has increased
by 140% between November 15th, 2008 and February 28th, 2015. At the time of writing,
the Federal Reserve has stopped purchasing assets. The Federal Reserve now faces the
decision of how to deal with a balance sheet worth US$ 4 trillion balance sheet: should
it start unwinding its positions or simply wait until the bonds it has purchased mature?
Neither exit strategies are expected to cause much trouble on the financial markets.
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Figure 1: Effect of Quantitative Easing on the US equity market: evolution of the S&P
500 between November 15, 2008 and February 28, 2015.
On the other hand, Europe faces a complex situation with more players. Europe took a
different route - austerity. This has caused trouble in many places, pushing unemployment
among the youths to between 25% and 50%. The worst case is Greece and in 2015 we had
the trouble. The 60 billion per month some 1.2 trillion bond buying will have to delicately
balance inflation and deflation. A serious negotiation is set to take place between Germany,
who as a major exporter benefits from a situation where the EuroZone does not implode,
and Greece who cannot continue with the heavy austerity. While both countries have
vastly different political and economic structures, they both benefit from a weaker Euro.
So a political compromise ironed out but the states and a quantitative easing sponsored by
the European Central Bank are coming at the same time to the Eurozone. With the Euro
weakening, the anticipation of a sharp increase of foreign capitals flowing into Switzerland
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triggered the Swiss currency move.
The real problem with quantitative easing in the U.S. and Europe is where the money goes:
to banks, whereas channeling it to people would more effective. The expectation has been
that bank would reorientate toward their historical financial intermediation role after the
credit crisis of 2007-2009. Chuptka(2015) following Peter Schiff of Euro Capital argues as
we to do that unemployment is the key problem.
4 The currency moves
Currencies tend to trend and reverse sharply. A typical example is the US$/EUR from 2002
to 2007 when the euro gradually fell until it sharply reversed. The trade to sell puts out
of the money on the US$/EUR exchange rate was very successful but it ended badly when
the currency turned. For example, puts that were 2 cents one day, 4 cents the next day and
then 28 cents the next, ended up at $4. Figure 2 shows the Euro exchange rate from its
start on January 1, 1999 to the end of February 2015. Physical Euros coins and banknotes
came in use across the Eurozone on January 1, 2002. Currently, the Eurozone includes the
following 19 of the 28 member states of the European Union: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.
Usually currencies move 0.5-1% or even 2% per day on a large move. The SNB’s drop of
the peg caused an immediate 39% increase in the CHF vs the EUR. See the January 15,
2015 move in Figure 3.
Figure 4 displays the evolution of the Swiss Franc against the four major currencies: Euro
(EUR), British Pound (GBP), US Dollar (US$) and Japanese Yen (JPY).
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the Swiss Franc against the other European currencies:
Danish Krone (DKK), Norwegian Krone (NOK), Czech Koruna (CZK), Hungarian Forint
(HUF), Polish Zloty (PLN), Russian Ruble (RUB), Swedish Krona (SEK).
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the Swiss Franc against the currencies of commodity pro-
ducing countries: Canadian Dollar (CAD), Brazilian Real (BRL), South African Rand
(ZAR), Australian Dollar (AUD), and New Zealand Dollar (NZD).
Figure 7 displays the relative performance of the CHF/EUR exchange rate against the
Swiss equity market index, the Swiss Market Index (SMI) and the SNB’s stock price from
December 1, 2014 to February 27, 2015. In the aftermath of the January 15th decision
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(a) 1-day move in the CHF/EUR exchange rate on January 15, 2015.
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Figure 3: Swiss franc U-turn
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Figure 4: Swiss franc U-turn: evolution of the Swiss franc against major international
currencies. 10
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Figure 5: Swiss franc U-turn: evolution of the Swiss franc against other European curren-
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from January 1, 1999 to February 28, 2015 (exchange rate, source: SNB).
30	  
40	  
50	  
60	  
70	  
80	  
90	  
100	  
110	  
120	  
130	  
140	  
1999	   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	   2014	   2015	  
CAD	  
BRL	  
ZAR	  
AUD	  
NZD	  
(b) Evolution of the CHF against the currencies of commodity producing countries
from January 1, 1999 to February 28, 2015 (index value = 100 on January 1, 1999).
Figure 6: Swiss franc U-turn: evolution of the Swiss franc against other European curren-
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to remove the peg, the SNB’s stock price fared far better than the swiss market and the
exchange rate. The swiss stock market has recovered: it closed February with only a 1.4%
loss with respect to its level on December 1st. We can contrast this with the performance
of the SNB stock price, down 3%, and of the currency, with an 11.7% loss.
Figure 8 shows the performance of the SMI versus the DAX 30, CAC 40 and FTSE in
their local currencies between January 1, 2014 to February 27, 2015. While the swiss stock
market was leading the DAX 30, CAC 40 and FTSE 100 through December 2014 and the
first half of January, the decision to remove the peg has had a noticeable impact on the
performance of the SMI. Over the period December 1, 2014 to February 27, 2015, the SMI
is trailing the DAX 30 and CAC 40 by around 15% and the FTSE by more than 3%.
Figure 7: Relative performance of the CHF/EUR exchange rate (blue), SNB’s stock price
(SNBN, green) and of the Swiss Market Index (SMI, red) from December 1, 2014 to Febru-
ary 27, 2015 (source: Yahoo! Finance).
5 Review of how to lose money trading derivatives
The SNB’s decision to remove the peg caused significant, and in some cases disastrous,
losses at banks, hedge funds, brokerage firms and individual traders both in and outside
of Switzerland.
In this section, we discuss typical ways to lose money while trading derivatives. The
underlying theme is that most disasters occur when one is not diversified in all scenarios, is
overbet, and a bad scenario occurs. We can then categorize losers in the CHF black swan.
Understanding how to lose helps one avoid losses!
The derivative futures industry deals with products in which one party gains what the other
party loses. These are zero sum games situations. Hence there will be large winners and
13
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Figure 8: Relative performance of the Swiss Market Index (SMI, blue) against the DAX 30
(red), CAC 40 (green) and FTSE 100 from January 1, 2014 to February 27, 2015 in their
local currencies (source: Yahoo! Finance).
large losers. The size of the gains and losses are magnified by the leverage and overbetting,
leading invariably to large losses when a bad scenario occurs. This industry now totals
over $700 trillion of which the majority is in interest and bond derivatives with a smaller,
but substantial, amount in equity derivatives. Figlewski (1994) attempted to categorize
derivative disasters and this chapter discusses and expands on that (see also Lleo and
Ziemba, 2014, 2015 for a discussion of banking, hedge fund and trading disasters) :
1. Hedge
In an ordinary hedge, one loses money on one side of the transaction in an effort to
reduce risk. To evaluate the performance of a hedge one must consider all aspects of
the transaction. In hedges where one delta hedges but is a net seller of options, there
is volatility (gamma) risk which could lead to losses if there is a large price move up
or down and the volatility rises. Also accounting problems can lead to losses if gains
and losses on both sides of a derivatives hedge are recorded in the firm’s financial
statements at the same time.
2. Counterparty default.
Credit risk is the fastest growing area of derivatives and a common hedge fund strat-
egy is to be short overpriced credit default derivatives. There are many ways to lose
money on these shorts if they are not hedged correctly, even if they have a mathemat-
ical advantage. In addition, one may lose more if the counterparty defaults because
of fraud or following the theft of funds, as was the case with MF Global.
3. Speculation
Derivatives have many purposes including transferring risk from those who do not
14
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wish it (hedgers) to those who do (speculators). Speculators who take naked un-
hedged positions take the purest bet and win or lose monies related to the size of the
move of the underlying security. Bets on currencies, interest rates, bonds, and stock
market index moves are common futures and futures options trades.
Human agency problems frequently lead to larger losses for traders who are holding
losing positions that if cashed out would lead to lost jobs or bonus. Some traders
increase exposure exactly when they should reduce it in the hopes that a market
turnaround will allow them to cash out with a small gain before their superiors find
out about the true situation and force them to liquidate. Since the job or bonus
may have already been lost, the trader’s interests are in conflict with objectives
of the firm and huge losses may occur. Writing options, and more generally selling
volatility or insurance, which typically gain small profits most of the time but can lead
to large losses, is a common vehicle for this problem because the size of the position
accelerates quickly when the underlying security moves in the wrong direction as in
the Victor Niederhoffer hedge fund disaster caused by the the Asian currency crisis of
1997. Since trades between large institutions frequently are not collateralized mark-
to-market large paper losses can accumulate without visible signs such as a margin
call. Nick Leeson’s loss betting on short puts and calls on the Nikkei is one of many
such examples. The Kobe earthquake was the bad scenario that bankrupted Barings.
A proper accounting of trading success evaluates all gains and losses so that the extent
of some current loss is weighed against previous gains. Derivative losses should also
be compared to losses on underlying securities. For example, from January 3 to June
30, 1994, the 30-year T-bonds fell 13.6%. Hence holders of bonds lost considerable
sums as well since interest rates rose quickly and significantly.
4. Forced liquidation at unfavorable prices
Gap moves through stops are one example of forced liquidation. Portfolio insurance
strategies based on selling futures during the October 18, 1987 stock market crash
were unable to keep up with the rapidly declining market. The futures fell 29%
that day compared to -22% for the S&P500 cash market. Forced liquidation due
to margin problems is made more difficult when others have similar positions and
predicaments and this leads to contagion. The August 1998 problems of Long Term
Capital Management in bond and other markets were more difficult because others
had followed their lead with similar positions. When trouble arose, buyers were scarce
and sellers were everywhere. Another example is Metallgellschaft’s crude oil futures
hedging losses of over $1.3 billion. They had long term contracts to supply oil at
fixed prices for several years. These commitments were hedged with long oil futures.
But when spot oil prices fell rapidly, the contracts to sell oil at high prices rose in
value but did not provide current cash to cover the mark to the market futures losses.
A management error led to the unwinding of the hedge near the bottom of the oil
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market and the disaster.
Potential problems are greater in illiquid markets. Such positions are typically long
term and liquidation must be done matching sales with available buyers. Hence,
forced liquidation can lead to large bid-ask spreads. Askin Capital’s failure in the
bond market in 1994 was exacerbated because they held very sophisticated securities
which were only traded by very few counterparties so contagion occurred. Once they
learned of Askin’s liquidity problems and weak bargaining position, they lowered
their bids even more and were then able to gain large liquidity premiums.
5. Misunderstanding the risk exposure
As derivative securities have become more complex, so has their full understanding.
The Shaw, Thorp and Ziemba (1995) Nikkei put warrant trade (discussed in Ziemba
and Ziemba (2013), Chapter 12) was successful because we did a careful analysis to
fairly price the securities. In many cases, losses are the result of trading in high-
risk financial instruments by unsophisticated investors. Lawsuits have arisen by such
investors attempting to recover some of their losses with claims that they were misled
or not properly briefed on the risks of the positions taken. Since the general public
and thus judges and juries find derivatives confusing and risky, even when they are
used to reduce risk, such cases or their threat may be successful.
A great risk exposure is the extreme scenario which often investors assume has zero
probability when in fact they have low but positive probability. Investors are fre-
quently unprepared for interest rate, currency or stock price changes so large and so
fast that they are considered to be impossible to occur. The move of some bond in-
terest rate spreads from 3% a year earlier to 17% in August/September 1998 led even
savvy investors and very sophisticated Long Term Capital Management researchers
and traders down this road. They had done extensive stress testing with a VaR risk
model which failed as the extreme events such as the August 1998 Russian default
had both the extreme low probability event plus changing correlations.
There was a similar failure of VaR and CVaR models because of the Swiss currency
unpegging see Danielson (2015) for discussion and some calculations. For current
regulations, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013). What is needed as
we argue below are convex penalty risk measures that penalize drawdowns enough
to avoid the disasters. Unfortunately these types of risk functions are not yet in
regulations of risk models although some applications have shown their superiority
to the VaR and CVaR models, see Geyer and Ziemba (2008), and Ziemba (2003,
2007).
Several scenario dependent correlation matrices rather then simulations around the
past correlations from one correlation matrix is suggested. This is implemented, for
example, in the Innovest pension plan model which does not involve levered derivative
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positions (see Ziemba and Ziemba (2013, Chapter 14) . The key for staying out of
trouble especially with highly levered positions is to fully consider the possible futures
and have enough capital or access to capital to weather bad scenario storms so that
any required liquidation can be done orderly.
Figlewski (1994) observes that the risk in mortgage backed securities is especially
difficult to understand. Interest only (IO) securities, which provide only the interest
part of the underlying mortgage pool’s payment stream, are a good example. When
interest rates rise, IO’s rise since payments are reduced and the stream of interest
payments is larger. But when rates rise sharply, the IO falls in value like other fixed-
income instruments because the future interest payments are more heavily discounted.
This signal of changing interest rate exposure was one of the difficulties in Askin’s
losses in 1994. Similarly the sign change between stocks and bonds during stock
market crashes as in 2000 to 2003 has caused other similar losses. Scenario dependent
matrices are especially useful and needed in such situations.
6. Forgetting that high returns involve high risk
If investors seek high returns, then they will usually have some large losses. The
Kelly criterion strategy and its variants provide a theory to achieve very high long
term returns but large losses will also occur. These losses are magnified with deriva-
tive securities and especially with large derivative positions relative to the investor’s
available capital.
7. How over betting occurs
Figure 9 shows how the typical over bet situation occurs assuming a Kelly strategy
is being used. The top of the growth rate curve is at the full Kelly bet level that’s
the asset allocation maximizing the expected value of the log of the final wealth
subject to the constraints of the model. To the left of this point are the fractional
Kelly strategies which under a lognormal asset distribution assumption use a negative
power utility function rather than log. So αwα, for α < 0 gives the fractional Kelly
weight f = 11−α . So u(w) =
−1
w corresponds to
1
2 Kelly with α = −1. Overbetting is
to the right of the full Kelly strategy and it is clear that betting more than full Kelly
gives more risk measured by the probability of reaching a high goal before a lower
level curve on the figure. It is this area way to the right where over betting occurs.
And virtually all of the disasters occur because of the over betting.
It is easy to over bet with derivative positions as the size depends on the volatility
and other parameters and is always changing. So a position safe one day can become
very risky very fast. A full treatment of the pros and cons of Kelly betting is in
Ziemba (2014).
Stochastic programming models provide a good way to try to avoid problems 1-6 by care-
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Figure 9: Relative growth and probabilities of doubling, tripling, and quadrupling initial
wealth for various fractions of wealth bet for the gamble win $2 with probability 0.4 and
lose $1 with probability 0.6.
fully modeling the situation at hand and considering the possible economic futures in an
organized way.
Hedge fund and bank trading disasters usually occur because traders overbet, the portfolio
is not truly diversified and then trouble arises when a bad scenario occurs. Lleo and Ziemba
(2015) discuss a number of sensational failures including Metalgesllshart (1993), LTCM
(1998), Niederhoffer (1997), Amaranth Advisors (2006), Merrill Lynch (2007), Socie´te´
Ge´ne´rale´ (2008), Lehman (2008), AIG (2008), Citigroup (2008), MF Global (2012) and
Monte Paschi (2013). Stochastic programming models provide a way to deal with the risk
control of such portfolios using an overall approach to position size, taking into account
various possible scenarios that may be beyond the range of previous historical data. Since
correlations are scenario dependent, this approach is useful to model the overall position
size. The model will not allow the hedge fund to maintain positions so large and so under
diversified that a major disaster can occur. Also the model will force consideration of
how the fund will attempt to deal with the bad scenario because once there is a deriva-
tive disaster, it is very difficult to resolve the problem. More cash is immediately needed
and there are liquidity and other considerations. Ziemba and Ziemba (2013, Chapter 14
explores more deeply such models in the context of pension fund as well as hedge fund
management.
Litzenberger and Modest (2009), who were on the firing line for the LTCM failure, propose
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a modification of standard finance CAPM type theory modified for fat tails and CVaR or
expected tail losses for the losses. Ziemba (2003, 2007, 2013) presents his approach using
convex risk measures and three scenario dependent correlation matrices depending upon
volatility using stochastic programming scenario optimization. Both of these approaches
would mitigate such losses. The key is not to over bet and have access to capital once a
crisis occurs and to plan in advance for such events.
6 The folly of the misleading value at risk measure
Value at risk (VaR) is the most widely used risk measure and has held a central place in
the development of international banking regulations in general and of the Basel Accord
in particular. The VaR of a portfolio represents the maximum loss within a confidence
level of 1−α (with a between 0 and 1) that the portfolio could incur over a specified time
period, for instance a d-days horizon (see Figure 10). For example, if the 10-day 95 percent
VaR of a portfolio is $10 million, then the expectation with 95 percent confidence is that
the portfolio will not lose more than $10 million during any 10-day period. Formally, the
(1 - α) VaR of a portfolio with (random) P&L X is defined as
VaR(X;α) = −{X|F (X) ≤ α} ,
which reads “minus the loss X (so the VaR is a positive number) chosen such that a greater
loss than X occurs in no more than a percent of cases.”
Morgan (1993) was the first to define VaR. Embrechts et al. (2005) cover risk management
from a mathematical and technical perspective. Jorion (2006) presents a comprehensive
and highly readable reference on VaR and its use in the banking industry. O’Brien and
Szerszen (2014) discuss VaR with reference to the 2007-9 financial crisis. Value at Risk has
the advantage of being a particularly simple risk measure, because it corresponds to minus
the α-quantile of the P&L distribution:
VaR(X;α) = −qα(X).
VaR is also elicitable (see Ziegel, 2014), property shared by all the quantiles.
An alternative definition for the VaR of a portfolio as the minimum amount that a portfolio
is expected to lose within a specified time period and at a given confidence level of a reveals
a crucial weakness. The VaR has a well-documented “blind spot” in the α-tail of the
distribution, which means that it is impossible to evaluate the probability and severity of
truly extreme events. The P&L distributions for investments X and Y in Figure 11 have
the same VaR, but the P&L distribution of Y is riskier because it harbors larger potential
losses.
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Figure 10: Value-at-Risk in terms of both PDF and CDF
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Figure 11: Two investments with same Value-at-Risk, but different degrees of desirability
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Furthermore, VaR is not a coherent risk measure. Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath
(1999) defined coherent risk measures as the class of monetary risk measures satisfying
four “coherence” axioms.
Monetary risk measures, first introduced by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999), is
a class of risk measures that equate the risk of an investment with the minimum amount
of cash, or capital, that one needs to add to a specific risky investment to make its risk
acceptable to the investor or regulator. In short, a monetary measure of risk r is defined
as
ρ(X) := min
k≥0
[an investment in a position (X + k) is acceptable] ,
where k represents an amount of cash or capital and X is the monetary profit and loss
(P&L) of some investment or portfolio during a given time horizon, and discounted back
to the initial time.
The coherence axioms are:
1. Monotonicity: if the return of asset X is always less than that of asset Y, then the risk
of asset X must be greater. This translates into
X ≤ Y in all states of the world ⇒ ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y ). (A1)
2. Subadditivity: the risk of a portfolio of assets cannot be more than the sum of the risks
of the individual positions. Formally, if an investor has two positions in investments X and
Y, then
ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ). (A2)
This property guarantees that the risk of a portfolio cannot be more (and should generally
be less) than the sum of the risks of its positions, and hence it can be viewed as an extension
of the concept of diversification introduced by Markowitz. This property is particularly
important for portfolio managers and banks trying to aggregate their risks among several
trading desks. VaR is not subadditive, meaning that VaR may not reward diversification,
potentially result in increased concentration risk.
3. Homogeneity: if a position in asset X is increased by some proportion k, then the risk
of the position increases by the same proportion k. Mathematically,
ρ(kX) = kρ(X). (A3)
This property guarantees that risk scales according to the size of the positions taken.
This property, however, does not reflect the increased liquidity risk that may arise when
a position increases. For example, owning 500,000 shares of company XYZ might be
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riskier than owning 100 shares because in the event of a crisis, selling 500,000 shares will
be more difficult, costly, and require more time. As a remedy, Artzner, Delbaen, Eber,
and Heath proposed to adjust X directly to reflect the increased liquidity risk of a larger
position.
4. Translation invariance or risk-free condition: adding cash to an existing position reduces
the risk of the position by an equivalent amount. For an investment with value X and an
amount of cash r,
ρ(X + r) = ρ(X)− r. (A4)
Stress testing complements VaR by helping address the blind spot in the α-tail of the
distribution. In stress testing, the risk manager analyzes the behavior of the portfolio
under a number of extreme market scenarios that may include historical scenarios as well
as scenarios designed by the risk manager. The choice of scenarios and the ability to fully
price the portfolio in each situation are critical to the success of stress testing. Jorion
(2006) discussed stress testing and how it complements VaR.
Conditional VaR (CVaR) is an improvement over VaR. Conditional VaR is the average of
all the d -day losses exceeding the d -day (1 − α) VaR (see Figure 12). Thus, the CVaR
cannot be less than the VaR, and the computation of the d -day (1− α) VaR is embedded
in the calculation of the d -day (1− α) CVaR.
Formally, the d -day (1− α) CVaR of an asset or portfolio X is defined as
CVaR(X;α) = −E [X|X ≤ F−1
X
(α)
]
. (A5)
This formula takes the inverse CDF of the confidence level, a, to give a monetary loss
threshold (equal to the VaR). The CVaR is then obtained by taking the expectation, or
mean value of all the possible losses in the left tail of the distribution, beyond the threshold.
CVaR is a coherent risk measure, implying that it accounts for diversification, and it can
be used efficiently to optimise portfolios (see Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000, 2002). Yamai
and Yoshiba (2005) compare VaR and CVaR.
However, CVaR is not elicitable, depends heavily on the quality of tail data and only
introduces a linear penalisation for the loss. This last point comes from the definition CVaR
as the mean tail loss operator, implying that CVaR computes risk as a linear function of
tail loss.
As an alternative, Ziemba (2013) has argued for convex risk measures that penalize losses
more and more as the losses mount. Rockafellar and Ziemba (2000, 2013) define convex
risk measures as monetary risk measures satisfying the five following axioms:
ρ(X + α · r) = ρ(X)− α. (R1)
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Figure 12: Conditional Value-at-Risk in terms of both PDF and CDF
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ρ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X) + (1− λ) ρ(Y ), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. (R2)
X ≤ Y ⇒ ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y ). (R3)
X < 0⇒ ρ(X) > 0. (R4)
ρ(0) = 0. (R5)
In Rockafellar and Ziemba’s definition, axioms (R2) and (R5) replace the more restrictive
coherence axioms (A2) and (A3). Separately, Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) proposed a an al-
ternate definition of convex risk measure simply replacing coherence axioms (A2) and (A3)
by the convexity property (R2).
However, the industry still uses the flawed value at risk which penalizes a loss of 1 billion
the same as 1 million if 1 million is the VaR number to be exceeded only 5% of the time.
Shorting the CHF was a popular trade and most firms would lever their position some 20
times or more. With such leverage a 5% move against the position wipes out all the value.
Yet the trades were seen as relatively low risk using VaR models at financial institutions
because volatility of the CHF was reduced by the SNB’s cap. See Danielson (2015) for
an analysis of the failure of VaR and CVaR risk models around the time of the Swiss
currency unpegging. An important point here is that the regulations do not include the
better convex risk measures.
Regardless of the risk measure, the design of scenarios and stress tests is crucial. Ziemba
(2003, 2007) makes the following remark and establishes a list of factors that should be
considered when designing scenarios:
The generation of good scenarios that well represent the future evolution of the
key parameters is crucial to the success of the modeling effort. Scenario gener-
ation, sampling, and aggregation are complex subjects, and I will discuss them
by describing key elements and providing various developed and implemented
models.
Scenarios should consider the following, among other things:
• mean reversion of asset prices;
• volatility clumping, in which a period of high volatility is followed by
another period of high volatility;
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• volatility increases when prices fall and decreases when they rise; trending
of currency, interest rates, and bond prices;
• ways to estimate mean returns;
• ways to estimate fat tails; and
• ways to eliminate arbitrage opportunities or minimize their effects.
Depending on the specificities of the problem, we could use either of five methods to
generate scenarios:
1. full knowledge of the exact probability distribution, P ;
2. use a known parametric family of statistical or probabilistic models;
3. moment matching;
4. historical simulation;
5. expert opinion
We could also combine several methods. For example, the Black-Litterman model (see
Black and Litterman, 1992) and its descendants combine a parametric approach with expert
opinions.
7 Losers and how it affected them
The major activity in Switzerland is money storage and management. The Swiss produce
watches, chocolate, pharmaceuticals and lots of tourists activities such skiing, hiking, and
visiting the beautiful countryside. Half the GDP comes from exports. Dhubat (2015)
discusses the Canadian-Swiss chocolate market. The CAD went from 0.85 to 0.74 CHF
with the unpegging, some 13.75% more expensive. When Ziemba sold a VW camper bus
in Zurich in 1973 each CAD was worth 4 CHF. Ziemba got CHF12,000 for a six month
old camper that cost C$3,000 six month when purchased. This CHF 12,000 are now worth
C$15,751.60 after the revaluation. This reminds us that the CHF has changed dramatically
overtime. Canada has about US$2.7 billion in chocolate sales versus total North American
sales of about US$20.2. Toronto-based Swiss national chocolatier Ingrid Laderach who sells
mostly Swiss made chocolate: “it was a huge shock, and being Swiss myself, I was kind of
disappointed at my countrymen to be honest with you”. She expects that the SNB’s move
would impact Valentine’s day and Easter when chocolate demand is high. This of course
is a plus for local Canadian producers.
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Ski resorts in Switzerland have been hit hard as their prices are about double those in
France and Austria. So Swiss resorts have needed to lower their prices - especially for
foreigners.
Swiss research institutes have lowered growth forecasts by 75%. Companies are squeezing
employees with lower pay and more hours of work. Retailers are cutting prices and have the
added problem of cross border shopping into France, Germany and Italy. High end products
such as the top watches made by TAG Heuer and others are less hit as their very high
profit margins act as a buffer against currency shocks. Private wealth management banks
face significant difficulties because they are forced to be more transparent. In addition
their traditional competitive advantages, such as secrecy and a perception of safety are
declining.
8 Banks and hedge funds
The losses are in the billions: Citigroup Inc, Deutsche Bank AG and Barclays PLC together
lost US$400 million. Marco Dimitrojevic’s US$830 million hedge fund was hit so bad that
it had to be closed.
Interactive Brokers (IB) is a web-based brokerage firm that is growing rapidly, offering
attractive terms to traders. IB has been rated #1 by Barron’s 3 years in a row, is a stock
pick of Motley Fool and is highly regarded. They have low fees for electronic trading. They
are aware of possible losses and do certain things to prevent them. They reported that
several customers suffered losses in excess of their account capital, amounting to about
$120 million which is about 2.5% of the net worth of the company. Ziemba has accounts
with them: what they do is charge an insurance fee if you have positions such that a 30%
move would wipe out all your capital. It is not clear whether they buy the puts for this
or simply pocket the money as part of their business (a form of self insurance). Possibly
because of the 120 million loss they are doubling the exposure fee, see Figure 13.
Very big losers were small time individual retail FOREX traders and the firms they traded
with. These individuals expect to win but in fact most lost because of the volatility of the
market and the fact that they are undercapitalized (or in other words, over levered). The
Aite Group LLC found that 11% of such traders expect to lose while the other 89% expect
to win, fully 41% expect to gain 10% per month. Citi estimated worldwide that there are
some 4 million such traders with about 150,000 in the US. The NFA estimated that 72%
lose money. Alpari which folded on Friday after the January 15 2015 unpegging had about
70,000 such clients. Gain Capital was growing customer trading volume at 90% per year
and their income was growing even faster from US$7 million in 2004 to US$230 million in
2008. The firm was allowing huge leverage, for example, a cash account with $5,000 could
control $1 million in currency positions which is 200:1 leverage. Some firms, like Gain, take
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Figure 13: Interactive Brokers portfolio insurance charges for risky positions in the US
the other side of the trades, so these small traders were not client customers but simply
counterparties. Gain, of course and others like them, won. With such leverage and high
volatility, most clients are losers. In the US the NFA required large capital and permitted
a 50:1 leverage so much of the business moved to London where leverage up to 500:1 was
allowed and in Cyprus 1000:1 leverage was possible. To get more customers, such firms
have extensive marketing because old customers are blowing up and leaving, but there is
always another sucker out there for them. Spot FOREX trading is not regulated in London
or Europe. In London, the financial conduct authority (FCA) only takes action if there is
fraud or boiler rooms in action (of course, one could suggest that this entire segment of
the industry is fraudulent).
A prime example with a different type of operating procedure was Drew Nir’s firm FXGM
as reported by Evans (2015) and Lex team (2015). FXGM has a 157 page prospectus which
has one dangerous provision for themselves: they do not try to obtain more funds or sue
clients who lose money or go into negative equity. They allowed 29% of their clients to use
credit cards even though that is not allowed and they are not on the other side but they
are supposed to hedge. Their clients lost about $225 million. FXGM are allowed forced
sale of customer positions in deficit but in this case the currency move was way too fast
to do much of this. Before January 15, they has a market cap of $1.4 billion and $300
million capital, which was $200 million above the $100 million required by the regulators.
Its shares had been listed in 2010 at $14. They handled $1.4 trillion of trades in Q4:2014.
Post peg the stock in FXGM fell 87.33% to $1.60 and as low as 98 cents from a pre January
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15 price of about $12.63. They needed a bailout and after the market closed on Friday,
Jeffries arranged a $300 million loan at 10% interest from Leucadia National Corp. The
shares rebounded and were worth $2.43 on Jan 23.
Another problem is co-mingled funds which is always a big danger. Stock and future
funds do not legally allow co-mingling of client and firm funds. MF Global (see Lleo and
Ziemba, 2014, 2015) is one example where this policy was violated. In FXGM’s case, this
inadvertent co-mingling led to their large losses.
9 What types of traders lost money
Actually one did not have to be doing trades to lose money. Anyone in Switzerland holding
foreign currencies took losses if they want to spend their money at home.
One Swiss colleague who is a professor and trader had the trading firm’s capital in US$
since many of their trades are in US$. Another professor colleague who is German but at
a university in Switzerland, plans a retirement in Germany so his CHF holdings including
his university pension gained in EUR terms but his other assets in other currencies loss
in CHF terms, he writes that he gained 10% in EUR and lost 10% in CHF in his overall
situation.
Some traders that lost money:
1. Short puts on the EUR/CHF cross. One bets that the EUR will not fall and collects a
small premium. The tails here follow typical deep out of the money favorite-longshot
bias characteristics. Ziegler and Ziemba (2015) study returns from buying and selling
hedged and unhedged puts and calls from 1985 to 2010 on the S&P 500 futures. These
types of trades usually win but if there is a big move in the wrong direction, the losses
can be very large. The Niederhoffer bankruptcy from the Asian currency crisis in
1997 is a typical example (Ziemba and Ziemba, 2013). $120 million in his hedge fund
was turned into $70 million by buying cheap Thai stocks which continued to drop.
Then the $70 million was turned into -$20 million by shorting out of the money S&P
puts. It turned out that the puts expired worthless the next month and Nieferhoffer
would have survived if he had more capital. This is another reminder that one needs
to be sufficiently capitalized for the type of trading one is doing. Usually one must
have a large capital being each short position to try to weather storms. In the CHF
case, a 15% move yielded large losses. All this depends on how fast the brokerage
firm is checking the positions. Minutes after the announcement the CHF was up 38%
and then settled at 15% ahead. Of course, those who were long CHF with short calls
on the EUR/CHF would gain but only the premium. So the losses are much greater
than the gains in this case.
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2. Short strangles and straddles: these involve selling both sides of the market, that is
short puts and short calls, collecting two premiums. One has a strike at the money
and the other is out of the money. Those like in (1) would have large losses less the
two premiums which would not lower the loss much. The opposite position, buying
the puts and calls, paying two premiums, which is usually a losing strategy, in this
case would have had had huge gains on the long CHF side.
10 Mortgage losses
Swiss fixed interest rates on mortgages are as low as 1.5%. With the exchange rate fixed,
borrowing in Swiss for homeowners in Austria, Hungary, Poland and other countries in
central and eastern Europe seemed like a good decision.3 During the real estate bubble of
2005-7, mortgage rates in theses countries were over 10%. In addition, the local currencies
were rising in value as investors anticipated Poland and Hungary joining the eurozone.
But in 2008, these currencies fell relative to the strong Swiss franc so the payments in-
creased. Poland banned new CHF lending and Hungary added the increased payments to
the principle owing.
There was a disconnect between western Europe and eastern Europe Swiss franc borrowers.
Those in the west are concentred in the business and financial sectors and more care was
taken to hedge the currency risk. But in eastern Europe, it was mortgages, some 566,000
Polish, 150,000 Romanian and 60,000 Croatian. And in Hungary, half of all households in
the whole country had foreign currency debt with most in Swiss francs. The mortgages are
not transparent as mostly the interest is paid in local currency although it is computed in
Swiss francs at a non-Swiss bank.
In 2011 the same flight to safety that devalued the Polish zloty and Hungarian forint in
2008 devalued the euro against the Swiss franc so all costs in francs increased such as these
loans.
Croatia pegged its currency, the kuna to the franc for one year. This had a large cost of at
least 30% of its currency reserves. And if the franc continues to rise agains the euro. Croa-
tian goods will be more expensive for French, German, Italian and other customers. Other
countries such as Romania are considering similar moves. In contrast, Hungary reacted by
forcing all mortgages such as these to convert their Swiss franc loans to Hungarian forints.
Foreign banks, and in particular Austrian banks, had to bear the adjustment cost.
3This section is based on Frum (2015) and other sources.
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11 From Quantitative Easing to financial unease?
The Quantitive Easing programme implemented by the US Federal Reserve as a remedy
for the 2007-9 financial crisis, has led to a massive increase in US stock prices, tripling the
S&P 500 index since the March 2009 low. Unemployment is now much lower even though
wages have not increased. This sets the stage for gradual interest rate hike, limited in scope
by the huge debt loads of the US government. With its USD 4 trillion balance sheet, the
Federal reserve Bank has a tricky policy road ahead and there likely will be some bumps
along the way. We see this already with daily up and down moves in the US stock market
as the probability of when the first rate rise will occur is reassessed daily.
Now, the European Central Bank is embarking on the same path. The monies they spend
to buy bonds do not directly go to the real problem, namely unemployment. But rather it
will basically go to the banks and lower interest rates. The divergence between US rates
heading up and European rates going down has helped fuel a massive shift to the US dollar
with most countries currencies dropping. The Swiss franc has historically been a safe haven
and its been for many years on a monotone increase in value. Jim Rogers noted this as did
Ziemba’s car sale in the 1970s.
Since then the franc has increased fivefold and is continuing to strengthen. Although
many aspects of the Swiss banking advantage are declining, there is still much demand
for the currency even with negative interest rates. This paper concerns the January 15,
2015 unpegging on the Euro Franc exchange rate at 1.20. Since 2001, the Swiss central
bank, partially owned by the cantons, had been buying various currencies to keep the
euro exchange rate at this level. This caused them considerable losses. These losses were
a factor in their decision to exit the peg. We discussed this abrupt action that caused
a large, fast move in currency prices and triggered large losses for many individuals and
institutions.
After the markets calmed down the currencies were roughly 15% lower. The Swiss National
Bank subsequently announced a loose target zone of 1.05-1.10 for the Euro. They were
prepared to spend considerable funds to keep this range. Meanwhile the Euro has declined
steeply against the US Dollar. Even short covering rallies are met with more selling. The
Euro, which once fetched 1.60 US dollars and was 1.40 in May 2014, was down to 1.05
when we went to press.
12 Final remarks: the aftermath of the unpegging
The impact on growth of the unpegging is likely to be minor. GDP growth forecasts for
2015 stand at about 1%. The historic strength of the currency as a safe haven has pushed
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the economy to focus on high value goods with low price elasticity such as pharmaceu-
ticals, private bankers, high technology engineering and luxury consumer good including
watches. Inflation will continue to be pushed down by currency appreciation while the
current account surplus should fall significantly (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015).
There are conflicting views of the situation. Some forecasters, such as Deutsche Bank,
predicted a move to 1.00 by the end of 2015 and a new cycle low of 85 cents by 2017.
Their reasoning articulates around the concept of a “Euro glut.” Deutsche Bank explains:
“simply put, it argues that the euro-area’s gigantic current account surplus, combined with
the European Central Bank’s Quantitative Easing program, and with negative interest rates
will continue to cause the Euro to tumble? Robin Winkler and George Saravelos of the
Deutsche Bank say that the region, which is currently a debtor to the world, must become
a net creditor to the word. To that end, its investment position needing to reach 30%
of GDP versus its current -10% before the current account surplus is sustainable. This
can only happen with net capital outflows of at least 4 trillion Euros. In fact, European
outflows in the last six months have been high, putting downward pressure on the Euro/US
dollar exchange rate.
According to economist Rachel Ziemba4 this argument lacks validity. The EuroZone has
net foreign assets (stock) and net surplus (flow). Until the Euro crisis, Europe’s balance
of payments was roughly balanced since the net surplus from the core countries especially
Germany offsets deficits in the periphery countries. Currently these latter countries are
doing a) fiscal adjustment, b) structural reforms and c) deleveraging to some extent. Hence
the deficits have shrunk even though the stock of debt is high. She argues that the Deutsche
bank conflates two drivers of Euro weakness, namely the Quantitative easing and lower rate
differential versus the US with one (current account surplus) that is supportive of Euro
strength. Should the trade and capital flows reverse because of these ECB actions, the Euro
weakness could extend, but the weaker Euro lowers imports and increases exports.
So what does this mean for the Swiss Franc? For Switzerland as for the United States, it
certainly seems that a continued increase in the respective values is likely until the exchange
rate greatly affects the economy of Switzerland and the United States. As we go to press,
the Euro/Franc exchange rare is at the bottom of its target range about 1.05 and the US
dollar is a par with the Swiss Franc with a 1.00 exchange rate.
4Private conversation.
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